

## Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era



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**ABSTRACT:** Joko Widodo's commitment in terms of eradicating corruption in Indonesia is very low, this is shown through the neglect of public voices on social media in the discourse of weakening the KPK. This study aims to explain the widespread public rejection of all efforts to weaken the KPK and analyze the factors that cause the government to choose to be ambiguous and lead to neglect. This research uses observation methods, documentation, literature studies and big data analysis. The study presents a different perspective from research that has discussed social media activism towards the weakening of anti-corruption institutions in Indonesia. The results of this study found that anti-corruption activism on social media was effective, such as the use of hashtags, coherent logic and credible actors, contributing to the rejection of the revision of the KPK Law and the dismissal of KPK employees through the National Insight Test. However, the massive anti-corruption movement on social media has no impact on the Joko Widodo administration's policymaking in the field of eradicating corruption, this paper also reveals the strong dominance of the political elite in policy making. The conclusion of this article is that the effectiveness of movements on social media to cause public unrest does not necessarily have an impact on decision-making made by state organizers.

**KEYWORDS:** KPK Weakening, Social Media Activism, Revision of the KPK Law, National Insight Test

### I. INTRODUCTION

The weakening of the KPK occurred due to the inconsistent attitude of the Joko Widodo government. The government's series of neglect and inconsistency towards the community movement protesting the weakening of the KPK indicates the narrowing of space for civil society in the state arena. Large demonstrations rejecting the idea of changing Law No. 30 of 2002 concerning the KPK did not receive a positive response from the government, and the revision of the law was still passed by parliament. The latest case is related to the wave of public protests that hit social media when 75 KPK employees were "eliminated" through the controversial National Insight Test, with the government giving the impression of neglect. Data shows that the weakening of the KPK has had an impact on reducing the eradication of corruption in Indonesia, this is reflected in the global Corruption Perception Index released by the Transparency International organization in 2020, Indonesia's position has fallen to 102nd out of 180 countries, even though in 2019 Indonesia was ranked 85th (Transparency International, 2018). The weakening of the KPK is real, but civil society's work to remind the government always ends in disappointment.

The literature on social media activism shows three things. First, studies show that the success of using social media in disseminating information, mobilizing support, and pressuring policy-making elites is determined by the ability of social media activists to consolidate distant virtual and offline movements (Dumitrica & Felt, 2020; Gukurume, 2017; Kurniawan et al., 2021; Sinpeng, 2021). Second, studies that describe public pressure on social media often reach a dead end due to the state's ability to control digital public spaces through strict supervision in certain cases (Kruse et al., 2018; Newnham & Bell, 2012). Third, studies examining the problem lie in the lack of synchronization between the resistance movement on social media and reporting in mainstream mass media (Bailo & Vromen, 2017). In the context of the anti-corruption movement in Indonesia on social media, of the three trends in the study, no research sees the failure of online activism as caused by the strong scenario of the political elite

# Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era

to pass the idea of weakening the independence of anti-corruption institutions which is carried out in a structured, systematic and seems legit.

This article also aims to complement the shortcomings of previous studies which ignored the commitment of national leadership to eradicating corruption in post-reform Indonesia. In particular, this article seeks to map various forms of public voices on social media opposing efforts to weaken the KPK and to analyze the factors that have led to widespread public support for the KPK. The answer to the problem above allows this study to provide an understanding of the changing pattern of attacks against the KPK which is becoming increasingly sophisticated so that no matter how big the public movement on social media is, it requires stronger efforts and appropriate strategies to pressure the government.

This article is based on the argument that government policymaking in terms of strengthening the eradication of corruption by the KPK is not only based on the will of the public which is voiced on various digital platforms. But it is also caused by a conflict of interest between political elites and law enforcers who consider that the corruption eradication work carried out by the KPK has "disrupted" the access and privileges they have had. Political party elites play an important role in changing the law by inserting new articles that reduce the authority of the KPK, both in terms of investigating, developing, or prosecuting cases. The weakening of the KPK, as has occurred so far, also sometimes comes from other law enforcement institutions, such as the police. The elite of this institution were caught several times by the KPK's silent operations which uncovered allegations of criminal acts of corruption. Thus, public movements on social media require effective collaboration between elements of anti-corruption society to sensitize the wider public from the hegemony and dominance of elites in the discourse on eradicating corruption.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### A. Post-Soeharto Corruption Eradication

After the fall of Soeharto, the demand to create a clean, transparent, and accountable government became one of the agendas that had to be completed. A core component of this effort is the establishment of a strong anti-corruption institution, namely the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) (Umam & Head, 2020). Based on Law No. 30 of 2002, the KPK was officially established in 2003. Many parties are optimistic about the future of eradicating corruption in Indonesia. The KPK was designed with a structure and standards that are different from the existing public agency model in Indonesia, separate from the executive structure. This aims to ensure that the KPK can eradicate corruption professionally, intensively, and sustainably. In carrying out its duties and authority, the KPK is independent, free from all forms of power intervention (Rahutomo et al., 2020). Initially, the KPK's responsibility and authority went beyond the police and prosecutor's office, including carrying out inquiries, investigations, and prosecutions; coordination and supervision with other law enforcers; prevention; supervision of state administrators and implementation of government programs. Apart from that, the KPK also has the authority to conduct wiretapping and confiscation of assets without court permission, requires banks and other institutions to provide confidential data on financial transactions and other matters, and has the right to investigate elite state officials without the president's approval; and synergize with the police and prosecutor's office in handling neglected corruption cases (Butt, 2011; Ganie-Rochman & Achwan, 2016; Umam et al., 2020).

Under the KPK, the war against corruption entered a new phase. The hunt for corruptors became more intense and systematic in all sectors, from the private sector and government to law enforcement agencies (Isra et al., 2017). The KPK has successfully investigated and prosecuted a wide range of officials, from mid-level prosecutors, top police officials, and senior civil servants to regional heads and even members of the national parliament (Butt, 2009). The success of the KPK in bringing corrupt officials who were previously untouchable and throwing them in prison, then returning the stolen assets, has increased public trust and support much higher than other law enforcement agencies (Schütte, 2012).





Figure 1.1. Data Graph of Corruption Crime 2004-2020

Source: Processed from Indonesian KPK data

## Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era

In handling corruption cases, the KPK works indiscriminately. Until 2020 alone, the KPK succeeded in arresting 1,264 perpetrators of corruption crimes from various agencies, professions, domestic regions, and even abroad (KPK RI, 2020). Since 2004, the KPK has arrested 280 DPR/DPRD members; 32 heads of institutions/ministries (central bank and cabinet ministers); 150 regional government heads (governors, regents, and mayors); 34 law enforcement officers (prosecutors; police; judges) and also actors from other professions. The crimes investigated by the KPK also vary, ranging from the procurement of goods and services, licensing, bribery, extortion, budget misuse, money laundering, and obstructing the legal process. For case handling area coverage, the KPK managed to penetrate as far as Singapore, Malaysia, and even Colombia. Of the total cases handled and prosecuted by the KPK in court since 2004, 811 cases of criminal acts of corruption have been declared *inkracht* by the court (having permanent legal force) (Laporan Penindakan KPK, 2020).



**Figure 1.2. Graph of Corruption Case based on Profession/Position**

Source: Processed from Indonesian KPK data

During the 17 years of the KPK's presence in Indonesia, there have been several corruption cases that have attracted public attention. Under the leadership of Antasari Azhar, in March 2003, the KPK carried out a sting operation against Prosecutor Urip Tri Gunawan for allegedly receiving a bribe of USD 660,000 in connection with the case of misappropriation of Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance funds involving conglomerate Sjamsul Nursalim. In November 2008, the KPK detained Aulia Pohan, a former official at the Central Bank, on suspicion of misusing funds from the Yayasan Pengembangan Perbankan Indonesia (YPPI) amounting to 100 billion rupiah. Pohan was the in-law of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia at that time (Widojoko, 2017). In mid-2009, the KPK managed to reveal evidence of recorded conversations between Police General Susno Duadji and a troubled businessman involved in the Century Bank fund disbursement case. (Tirto.id, 2019).

In December 2012, the public was also shocked by the detention of Police General Djoko Susilo by the KPK for allegedly committing corruption in the procurement of driving license simulator equipment for the traffic police (Isra et al., 2017). The general chairman of the Prosperous Justice Party, Luthfi Hasan Ishak, was detained by the KPK in January 2013 on suspicion of accepting bribes in beef import cases (Umam et al., 2020). In October 2013, the KPK directly arrested the chairman of the Constitutional Court, Akil Mochtar, who was suspected of accepting bribes in several regional head election dispute cases. At the beginning of 2014, the KPK also detained Anas Urbaningrum and several Democratic Party elites who were named as suspects in corruption in funds for athletes' homes and sports complexes in West Java (Ganie-Rochman & Achwan, 2016).

Police officials were again involved in cases of bribery and gratification. In January 2015, Police General Budi Gunawan was named a suspect by the KPK, even though he was the sole candidate for Chief of the Indonesian National Police that President Joko Widodo proposed to the DPR (Muttaqin & Susanto, 2018). KPU Commissioner Wahyu Setiawan, was caught in a sting operation in the bribery case of Harun Masiku, a PDIP politician who asked to be smoothed out as a member of the DPR-RI through an interim replacement scheme. Edhy Prabowo, Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in Jokowi's cabinet, was arrested by the KPK in November 2020 because he was involved in a corruption case in the process of determining prospective lobster seed exporters. In early December 2020, Minister of Social Affairs and PDIP politician Juliari Batubara was arrested by the KPK for allegedly accepting bribes in the Covid-19 social assistance procurement project for the Jabodetabek area.

## **Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era**

### **B. *Sosial Media Activism***

Activism comes from the word activist, defined as an individual or group of individuals who actively move together to influence the public by pressing for authority holders through training, negotiation, persuasion, advocacy, resistance, and protest. Their movements promote social, political, economic, environmental, cultural, or other changes, and the scale of the movement can be local, national, or global (Yavuz Görkem, 2017). Meanwhile, digital activists can be defined as people who support, oppose, or reject change as part of collective action based on digital technology, such as social media platforms. Over the last two decades, the use of these new technologies has encouraged the involvement of more citizens to mobilize, activate, and manage movements, especially in the social and political fields (Seelig et al., 2019).

The current Earth population is reported to be 7.85 billion, and 4.3 billion people (55.1%) using social media platforms worldwide (April Global Statshot Report, 2021). Social media platforms enable individuals to easily share their thoughts at a minimal cost, empowering them to actively engage with their communities and drive change through collective action (Leong et al., 2019). In line with this, Lim (2013) shows that social media provides a space for individuals, especially young people, to participate egalitarianly in the process of production, consumption, and distribution of ideas, knowledge, and culture. This participatory culture can function as infrastructure that can be easily borrowed and used for socio-political activities. In plain language, digital activism occurs when someone utilizes digital technology as an alternative to political activism to reclaim narrowed political voices and space.

Social media is about social interactions and social networks so that networks created on social media resemble existing offline networks (Lim, 2013; Velasquez & LaRose, 2015). Social media activism plays a crucial role in the wave of world change, such as lifting political oppression, informing about election violations, distributing messages from the opposition, corrupting oligarchs, inspiring people to speak out, and organizing people for direct collective action (Chitanana, 2020). Likewise, in Africa and the Arab region several decades ago, social media provided a discursive space for ordinary citizens to demand clean government, handling the economic crisis, unemployment, human rights violations, and endemic corruption (Gukurume, 2017). In the case of eradicating corruption in Indonesia, anti-corruption campaigns carried out on social media have a high level of effectiveness (Kurniawan et al., 2021).

However, several studies found a pessimistic attitude toward using digital technology in social and political activism. Lobera & Portos (2020) stated that digital technology does not substantially change patterns of political engagement but instead strengthens pre-existing structures and inequalities. Another opinion also states that social media platforms can attract millions of digitally connected users, but this is not a sign of the return of the public space proposed by Habermas (Kruse et al., 2018). In other words, the interactions and discourse fought for in the digital public space are only pseudo. The ineffectiveness of social media is caused by the loose attachment of social media activism in mobilizing grassroots movements to win a socio-political issue (Sinpeng, 2021). The democratic values expected to spread and grow in social media are only "pseudo-democracy" and have become a pathology for democracy itself (Hasfi et al., 2017).

Indonesia is one of the world's largest social media user bases (Winarnita et al., 2022). In the joint report "We Are Social" and "Hootsuite" released in early 2021, out of a total of 274.9 million Indonesians, 170 million residents (or around 61.8 percent) are social media users. Most Indonesians actively use social media platforms such as YouTube (93.8%), WhatsApp (87.7%), Instagram (86.6%), Facebook (85.5%) and Twitter (63.6%) (Indonesian Digital Data, 2021). Currently, Twitter users in Indonesia are around 14 million people (Statista.com, 2021). The use of social media for socio-political purposes began in 2009 when millions of Facebook users raised donations entitled "Coins for Prita" who were found legally guilty by the Tangerang High Court and ordered to pay damages of 22,000 USD for bringing glory to the good name of Omni International Hospital. Public solidarity with the injustice experienced by Prita Mulyasari spread throughout Indonesia, and the collection of funds reached 90,000 USD, exceeding the specified fine amount (Molaei, 2015).

Another phenomenal case that occurred in mid-2009 was when there was a conflict between the KPK and the Republic of Indonesia Police, popularly called "Cicak VS Buaya" Volume I, where the Cicak refers to the KPK and the Buaya was the personification of the police. The KPK was investigating a corruption case and had wiretap evidence from a conversation between Police General Susno Duadji and a person suspected of corruption. Not long after that, two KPK leaders, Bibit Samad Riyanto and Chandra M Hamzah, were arrested by the police on charges of extortion. The public reacted by saying this was a counterattack by corruptors against the KPK on Facebook, echoing support for the KPK by creating a page of 1,000,000 Facebookers supporting Candra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Riyanto. Massive public attention to this case caused the police to drop the charges against the two KPK leaders.

# Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era

## III. METHOD

This article raises the issue of anti-corruption activism on Twitter or online media, especially regarding the KPK Law revision and the dismissal of KPK employees through the National Insight Test, which occurred during the second period of Joko Widodo's administration. This research uses descriptive qualitative research by utilizing big data, such as documents or data available on the official KPK institutional website, such as documents regarding KPK Law No. 30 of 2002; KPK Law No. 19 of 2019; Government Regulation No. 41 of 2020; KPK Regulation No. 1 of 2021; and Decree No. 652 of 2021. Apart from that, this research also takes information spread in online media such as *kompas.com*, *tirto.id*, *tempo.co*, *straitstime.com*, *scmp.com*, *indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au*, *thjakartapost.com*, and so forth. This article also quotes a map of conversations on Twitter social media.

Several applications are used in analysis methods, such as Nvivo 12+ and Datawrapper, to help analyze documents or data based on big data. This research was carried out by collecting official government and KPK documents, Capturing conversations on social media (Twitter), and online media reports. The official documents obtained are mapped manually in table/matrix form to facilitate the analysis process. Meanwhile, for data from Twitter and online media, the first step is to enter keywords that match the research topic and then capture them via the Nvivo 12+ application. The capture results are then analyzed using the "sentiment analysis" feature to measure public sentiment towards the keywords entered. The results of these measurements are then input into the Datawrapper application to get data visualization that is easier to understand and read. As for the method used to analyze the information contained in online media, the researcher created a table to map several opinions and events that accompanied the polemic that occurred in tabular form. The results are then arranged chronologically for more in-depth analysis.

## IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### A. The Weakening of KPK

The path to eradicating corruption in many countries is never easy, as it is intertwined with political power dynamics, culture, and the behavior of entities that have long held influence over the previous system. (Transparansi Indonesia, 2018). The biggest challenge faced by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) Hong Kong in fighting corruption was when they started to touch on corruption crimes committed by the police, an incident triggered a siege of the ICAC office by thousands of police officers. In Afghanistan, two Anti-Corruption Criminal Justice Center (ACJC) officials were killed because of their persistence in eradicating corruption. The eradication of corruption reached a dead end when the Kenya Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (KEACC) investigative powers were revoked by politicians in the Kenyan Parliament. In Romania, Prime Minister Dacila's policy proposed a new law that subordinated the National Anti-corruption Directorate (DNA) to the government.

The Indonesian KPK also encounters various weakening scenarios carried out by parties who feel disturbed by the actions of the KPK. The weakening pattern used is almost the same; if the KPK investigates or uncovers major cases involving big names in the political world, law enforcement institutions (police and prosecutors), or conglomerates, it will be accompanied by a counterattack against the KPK (corruptor fight back). This counterattack could take the form of criminalization, terror, intimidation, persecution, or proposing changes to regulations to reduce the authority of the KPK. However, every time there is a counterattack by corruptors against the KPK, various elements of society are always present to support the KPK. In the past, there have been several attempts to weaken the KPK, which received widespread attention from the public.

Table 1.1. The KPK Weakening Forms

No	Category	Year	Weakening Form
1	Criminalization	2009	Bibit Samad Riyanto and Chandra M Hamzah were arrested on charges of extortion
		2012	Elite police troops surrounded the KPK building to arrest KPK investigator Novel Baswedan
		2015	KPK chairman Bambang Widjayanto and Abraham Samad were arrested
2	Terror/violence	2016	Novel Baswedan was intentionally hit by a car by an unknown person
		2017	Theft of a KPK investigator's laptop Throwing acid on investigator Novel Baswedan's face

## Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era

			Throwing Molotov cocktails at the house of the KPK chairman
3	Negative Stigma	2019	Accusing that there is a radical/taliban group within the KPK
4	Pruning of Authority		Revision of the KPK Law
5	Removal of Employees	2021	Implementation of the National Insight Test as a condition for transferring KPK employee status to ASN

**Source:** Processed from online media

This article will highlight the last two cases that occurred during the second term of Joko Widodo's administration in 2019-2021, namely the revision of the KPK law and the elimination of 75 KPK employees through a national insight test. These two cases caused several things in the campaign against corruption in Indonesia. They trigger a large wave of rejection, such as mass demonstrations and hashtag wars on social media. Additionally, several community groups believe that the recent weakening of the KPK has entered the final episode of eradicating corruption.

### **B. Public Voice on the Revision of the KPK Law**

Initiative to amend KPK Law no. 30 of 2002 came from DPR members from five political parties supporting the government, namely Riska Mariska (PDIP); Achmad Baidowi (PPP); Ibn Multazam (PKB); Saiful Bahri Ruray (Golkar); and Teuku Taufiqulhadi (Nasdem) (Tirto.id., 2019). This plan received the blessing of President Joko Widodo, who argued that the KPK Law Number 30 of 2002 was almost 17 years old, so limited improvements were needed. The President's statement was opposed by the majority of civil society and public figures who said that the main aim of the revision of the KPK Law was to weaken the eradication of corruption in Indonesia. The existence of several new articles in the draft revision of the Law further strengthens this suspicion, the articles which have been an effective weapon for KPK employees to catch corruptors have been eliminated or made difficult by complicated conditions.

The data below shows that the idea of changing the KPK Law is a form of weakening the KPK which then triggers a reaction of rejection from the public, various groups ranging from ordinary people, academics, religious figures, NGOs, and students to social media activists. Most of the public's voices questioned independence, transparency, bureaucratization, cuts to authority, the executive's ambivalent attitude, and the DPR's lack of program priorities and knowledge of the juridical, philosophical, and sociological aspects in discussing laws. All the indicators displayed point to a situation that will slowly kill the KPK, and the eradication of corruption will be at its lowest point.

Ahmad Syafii Maarif, a respected public figure in Indonesia, said that ratifying the revision of the KPK law violates procedures. The DPR should involve the public and related state institutions (such as the KPK and The Ministry of Law and Human Rights) in discussing each article. In line with this opinion, Azyumardi Azra, a well-known academician on campus, said that changes to the law carried out by parliament would lead the KPK to a crisis of integrity and demoralization. By making KPK employees into employees under the executive branch, the independence of KPK employees will fall. Cultural figure Sujiwo Tedjo even called on the public not to vote for presidential candidates or political parties that support weakening the KPK in the 2024 general elections.

Representatives from the NGO Indonesia Corruption Watch assess that the revision of the KPK law is a systematic effort by a handful of people who have evil intentions regarding the management of public money, so one way to facilitate its implementation is to paralyze corruption eradication activities. Constitutional law expert Zainal Arifin Mochtar highlighted the issue of reducing the KPK's authority in resolving corruption cases, such as the bureaucratization of the wiretapping process, the dominant existence of supervisory boards, and the importance of establishing the KPK at the regional level. Allisa Wahid, who is the daughter of former President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur), strongly criticized President Joko Widodo's ambivalent attitude, stating that Jokowi would be remembered as the first president who contributed to weakening the KPK.


Religious leaders have taken a strong stance against the KPK Law revision. The Nahdhalatul Ulama group stated that Muslims reject any attempts to weaken KPK masked in a revision of the Law. Figures representing church circles also stated that Christians in Indonesia reject the revision of the KPK Law which aims to weaken the KPK. Representatives from the Hindu religion said they supported a stronger KPK and refused the revision of the KPK Law. Muhammadiyah figure Busyro Muqodas expressed the same thing, according to him, there are four schemes to weaken the Corruption Eradication Commission, namely by forming a

## Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era

Supervisory Board, wiretapping authority, not being allowed to recruit independent investigators except elements of the police, prosecutors, and ASN, and finally the KPK is permitted to issue a letter to stop investigating cases.

In addition to the rejection above, college students also held large demonstrations in various regions and almost paralyzed big cities in Indonesia. In Jakarta, hundreds of thousands of people gathered at the DPR and on protocol roads to pressure the DPR and the President to cancel the discussion of the draft revision of the KPK Law. In Yogyakarta, tens of thousands of people from various elements of the movement gathered to express their rejection and demands. On the island of Sumatra: Riau, Lampung, Palembang, Jambi, and Aceh, thousands of students took to the streets to protest the discussion of changes to the law in Parliament. In Sulawesi, Makassar, Palopo, Manado, Gorontalo, and Kendari students surrounded parliament and government centers at the regional level to express their rejection and urge Joko Widodo to take responsibility for this incident. In Magelang, Malang, Surabaya, Cirebon, and Bandung, students held long marches to reject the revision of the KPK Law.

The world of social media is currently in upheaval, with discussions about the revision of the KPK Law highlighted through hashtags that accompany the ongoing activities. Public pressure on social media was raised by using the hashtags #GejayanCalling, #StudentMovement, #SaveKPK, and #ReformInCorruption. These hashtags have become trending topics and the main discussions on Twitter. The social media team supporting the government is powerless to face netizens' negative actions and comments regarding the discussion of the KPK Law. The extent of public support for rejecting the revision of the KPK Law on social media is reflected in netizen sentiment towards the KPK Law.



**Figure 1.3. Public Sentiment on Twitter with the keywords KPK Law**

Source: Twitter data processed by Datawrapper

The search results for the keyword "KPK Law" on Twitter, which was captured and the data was processed via the Nvivo 12+ application, found that 95% of Twitter users viewed the KPK Law as 'Very Negative'. This negative sentiment confirms and correlates with public opinion, which considers the KPK Law to be a form of weakening the KPK. The public presumes that the revision of the KPK Law in many aspects has many problems, including the lack of public involvement in its drafting, the haste of parliament in discussing it, the inclusion of articles that have the potential to reduce the authority of investigators in resolving a case, and the existence of a supervisory board which is allegedly a way for the executive to subdue the KPK.

Not satisfied with just revising KPK Law, the DPR, and the government through the hands of the selection committee for KPK leadership candidates, are planning to nominate a police officer (Firli Bahuri) to be one of the candidates to lead the KPK for the 2019-2023 period. Despite concerns about his track record, Firli Bahuri was finally appointed by the DPR as Chairman of the KPK, this was a major blow to the fight against corruption in Indonesia. Before being elected as Chairman of the KPK, Firli was the KPK's director of enforcement. And while Firli was deputy for enforcement, there were several leaks in arrest operations in the field. Firli was also found guilty by the KPK Internal Supervisory Board for committing serious ethical violations when he met with the Governor of West Nusa Tenggara who was being investigated by the KPK in a gratification case. Firli's luxurious lifestyle was also highlighted by the public and was later found guilty by the Supervisory Board.

However, the success of the community movement in pushing the issue of weakening the KPK to become the dominant discourse in the public discourse arena, the government, and the DPR did not make it a consideration in decision-making. Two

## Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era

crucial things that will be the main entry point for weakening the KPK approved by the two institutions, the DPR and President Joko Widodo. First, the revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission Law is approved and passed into law by all factions in the DPR, including the factions that are in opposition to the government. The government then enacted Law No. 19 of 2019 as a replacement for Law No. 30 of 2002, which contributed directly to the elimination of KPK employees that occurred in 2021. Secondly, Inspector General of Police Firlil Bahuri was selected by the DPR to occupy the top position as chairman of the KPK for the 2019-2023 period.

### C. Public Voice on the National Insight Test

Unlike the previous KPK Law, the KPK Law no. 19 of 2019 states that KPK employees are State Civil Apparatus (ASN). The consequence of the implementation of this law is that KPK employees who do not yet have ASN status are required to be appointed as ASN immediately. In mid-2020, the government issued Government Regulation No. 41 of 2020 concerning the relocation of KPK employee status to ASN. The technical implementation of this status transfer is further regulated in KPK Regulation No. 1 of 2021 concerning Procedures for Transferring KPK Employees to State Civil Apparatus. In Article 5, all employees who wish to transfer their status are required to take the competency test and assessment of the National Insight Test (TWK) as stated in paragraph (4), the implementation of which will be carried out in collaboration with the State Civil Service Agency (BKN).

The test was taken by 1359 employees from various levels and positions. As a result, 75 people did not pass the National Insight Test. Through Decree No. 652 of 2021, the KPK chairman deactivated 75 employees from all tasks they were carrying out. This announcement sparked a polemic in an immense community because of many irregularities and technical implementations found in the process. Responding to this problem, President Joko Widodo stated that TWK should not be the only measurement to pass the test. After that, the KPK and BKN made some changes. According to their statement, 24 people were given the opportunity to be re-trained, but the other 51 were declared unable to be saved.

**Tabel 1.2. National Insight Test Controversy**

No	Stage	Irregularity
1	Preparation of KPK Regulation No. 1 of 2021	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. In the initial formulation meeting until the discussion of the initial draft there was no article regarding the TWK assessment (August 2020-5 January 2021).</li> <li>2. The KPK Regulation harmonization meeting on January 26 was held outside the norm.</li> <li>3. The date for the establishment and implementation of the KPK regulations was signed at the same time (27 January 2021)</li> <li>4. In the Perkom socialization (17 February 2021) the legal consequences were not explained if employees were unable to fulfill the TWK</li> <li>5. Manipulation of the KPK-BKN MOU, because the signing of the cooperation and contract for implementing the TWK test between BKN and KPK was made backdated.</li> </ol>
2	Implementation of the National Insight Test	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. BKN is not competent in carrying out the TWK assessment.</li> <li>2. The test involves the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), State Intelligence Agency (BIN), Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), Army (AD).</li> <li>3. The test questions in the interview session are gender biased, violate human rights, are discriminatory and are not related to eradicating corruption</li> </ol>



## Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era

3	After determining the results of the TWK assessment	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The chairman of the KPK should not issue Decree Number 652 of 2021 which deactivates 75 employees who do not meet the requirements.</li> <li>2. Shifting responsibility between BKN and KPK in terms of originating the TWK idea.</li> <li>3. BKN and KPK inconsistencies when test participants request access to TWK results.</li> </ol>
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Source: Processed from PKPK Draft, Ombudsman RI, and online media

The National Insight Test, which resulted in the "dismissal" of KPK employees, drew criticism from many parties. A coalition of professors across universities throughout Indonesia sent a letter to President Joko Widodo to cancel the National Insight Test for KPK employees. The professors concluded that the implementation of TWK was not based on law and potentially violated public ethics. Furthermore, in the first point, it is explained that in the KPK Law no. 19 of 2019 and Government Regulation no. 41 of 2020 concerning the Transfer of KPK Employees to ASN, there is no obligation for KPK employees to take TWK. In the second conclusion, the questions asked in TWK indicated elements of racism and privacy violation and are discriminatory against certain groups. As stated by Tata Khairiyah, the interviewer asked, What do you do when you are dating? Are all Chinese the same? Choose the Koran or Pancasila? Are you willing to take off the hijab or not? The questions that arise are a form of carelessness on the part of the exam organizers because they are unrelated to the duties and functions of the KPK as an institution for eradicating corruption.

It is strongly suspected that the implementation of the TWK was designed to eliminate a group of highly dedicated KPK employees who were the backbone of eradication efforts in Indonesia. The creators of this elimination scenario expressed opinions about the Taliban and radicals controlling the KPK, making it dangerous for Pancasila, the Republic of Indonesia, and the constitution. This cruel accusation can be easily refuted because those who were dismissed from the KPK were not only from the Moslem but also Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and Confucians. The dismissal of KPK employees was based more on past grudges and concerns about uncovering large-scale corruption cases that were being investigated by these people.

A group of journalists who are members of Indonesia Leaks carried out a clustering of dozens of KPK employees dismissed on the grounds of Not Qualified (TMS). The first cluster is KPK employees who revealed two ethical violations committed by Firlil Bahuri. In Firlil's first ethical violation when he was Deputy for the KPK, he met the Governor of West Nusa Tenggara, Muhammad Zainul Majdi, who was currently in court at the KPK. Second, Firlil was investigated for allegedly violating the code of ethics by living a luxurious lifestyle by renting a helicopter for personal use. The KPK investigators and investigators involved in the ethics case were declared not to have passed the TWK. The second cluster is KPK investigators who once investigated the alleged ownership of the fat accounts of Police General Budi Gunawan, who now serves as chairman of the State Intelligence Agency. The third cluster is investigators and investigators who are handling major corruption cases. These include corruption involving political parties, the police, and businessmen, corruption in social assistance, export of lobster seeds, bribery of Harun Masiku, and extortion carried out by KPK investigators from the police. The fourth cluster is the administrators of the KPK employee forum who mobilized support to reject the revision of the KPK law. The fifth cluster is employees considered vocal and brave enough to criticize the KPK leadership.




Figure 1.4. Social Network Analysis "KPK" (11-12 May 2021)

Source: Fahmi, (2021)

## Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era

Related to the escalation of tensions that occurred at the KPK after the announcement that 75 employees were declared Ineligible, discussions about the KPK on Twitter also experienced a drastic increase. Various hashtags represent the public's feelings regarding ways to weaken the KPK, which is increasingly meeting its targets. On Twitter, #Berani JujurPecat #SaveKPK #MosiTidakPercaya #KPKEndGame dominates conversation traffic. Based on the public vote map seen in the social network analysis regarding KPK, the community group that rejected the "elimination" of 75 KPK employees through the National Insight Test was dominant compared to the cluster that supported the KPK's decision regarding the 75 employees. The resistance group comes from civil society, and their composition is very plural. They are concerned about public issues such as corruption, humanity, human rights, gender, the environment, and artists. The concerns of civil society figures were echoed by Twitter users, indicating that the TWK received a negative response from the wider community. Meanwhile, the camp that supports the implementation of TWK comes from accounts known as loyalists to Joko Widodo's government. However, their narrative was unable to match the negative opinions of the TWK rejection group.

**Table 1.3. Tweets Sample about TWK**

No	Account	Content	Time	Retweets	Like
Group opposing the deactivation of 75 KPK employees through TWK					
1	@febridiansyah (Anti-corruption activist and former spokesperson for KPK)	My condolences. The desire to get rid of 75 KPK employees was proven. They are still forced to be inactive even though there is no strong legal basis. Moreover, the Constitutional Court's decision emphasized that the transition to ASN status must not be disadvantageous to KPK	11 May 2021 5.16 PM	4.851	10.100
2	@anandabadudu (Social activist and artist)	Past method for weakening the KPK was very brutal. Investigators were terrorized, hit on the road, leaders criminalized. Now the weakening is structured and systematic. Executive, legislative joinforces, Law Revision. The National Police became leader. Intelligence operations raised the issue of the Taliban. Finally, the Constitutional Court rejected the formal test. The operation is	11 May 2021 11.33 PM	3.600	7.195
3	@AlissaWahid (Humanitarian activist and daughter of former President Gus Dur)	Confirmed for me, TWK @KPK_RI is not clear. Ms. @tatakhoiriyah, KPK Public Relations staff, was declared ineligible. She was my personal assistant, from Kyai's family, cites Qunut every morning prayer, she has been active in NU since she was young, helped pioneer & grow the @gusdurian network, it is impossible not to have national	11 May 2021 7.43 PM	1.486	3.394

## Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era

4	@emilsalim2010 (Environmental figure and former minister of the New Order era)	"Light of the moon, bright in the river. The crocodile appears, thought to be dead. Don't believe the official mouth of the KPK. They'd fired their own child because they are afraid of dying."	12 May 2021 5.23 AM	1.311	4.600
5	@nazaqistsha (Novel Baswedan was included in the dismissed employees)	The National Insight Test (TWK) is not a competency test or test for employee entry selection. In Law 19/2019 and the Constitutional Court Decision, it is explained that KPK employees becoming ASN are only transitional and must not harm KPK employees. But it was used to get rid of 75 employees, some of whom were handling large	11 May 2021 10.02 PM	2.869	7.203
		Isn't it weird that the anti-corruption struggle, treated like an enemy in our own country, but actually respected internationally?	12 May 2021 1.31 AM	4.037	12.600
6	@madisnur (Human Rights Activist)	Why do 75 KPK employees "need to be removed" by corrupt agents? Let's check what impact this will have on the corruption cases being handled.	11 May 2021 9.31 PM	3.525	7.629
Group supporting the deactivation of 75 KPK employees through TWK					
7	@AliNgabalinNew (Jokowi loyalists)	The Old Man's statement is very PREJUDICE regarding the 75 KPK employees who are TMS as ASN employees. His assumption and the news circulating that 75 KPK employees have been dismissed is a LIE. Because the dismissal was taken after coordination between the KPK and BKN & KemenPAN-RB to be processed in accordance with the provisions of the existing law.	12 May 2021 5.05 PM	449	1.635
8	@mantriss (Politician)	They said TWK was a consequence of changing status. If the test is not credible, let's ask together. I just reject the notion that the KPK can be paralyzed if 1-2 people are not in it. That's unreasonable and very dangerous. Sorry about this,	11 May 2021 9.41 PM	53	217

Source: Data from Twitter

The high level of public attention to the KPK issue shows that the public really believes that what the KPK is carrying out in eradicating corruption is on track. However, its existence is very unpopular with political elites, government bureaucracy, and economic oligarchic forces, who all had access to capital resources. It is trivial for us to understand why the large amount of public support for the KPK is not supported equally by partiality and a firm stance by the ruling elite to issue policies that reject all efforts to weaken the KPK. There is a common thread in all events and which party has the significant motive to weaken the KPK.

## Anti-Corruption Activism on Social Media: Public Voices against the Weakening of the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) in the Joko Widodo Era

Parliamentary politicians, regional heads, law enforcers, executive officials, and businessmen are under duress by the KPK's arrest operations. At this point, the effectiveness of the KPK's methods is considered an obstacle and threat to the ruling regime's instant developmentalism.

The peak of the "annoyance" of corruptors gained momentum in the era of Joko Widodo. Their first step was to dismantle the various authorities that have been the strength of the KPK so far. As the second step, Jokowi transports the majority of political power in a jumbo coalition either in parliament or in the government cabinet. So that the operation to weaken the KPK can take place without significant obstacles from existing political forces.

From the two events highlighted in this article, the revision of the KPK Law and the dismissal of dedicated KPK employees, it can be analyzed which parties played a massive role in weakening the KPK. First, politicians (both in parliament and political party administrators) chose to remain silent or support them. Based on the data above, caught politicians were in the highest category. In parliament, they maneuver to formulate legal products, and then the KPK is classified in the executive group; employees must come from ASN, establish a Supervisory Board, and cut various authorities of KPK investigators. Aim to make it easier to control the KPK's enforcement work in the field. Apart from that, Firli Bahuri, an active police officer and former Deputy for Enforcement at the KPK, who had many problems, was proposed and approved by parliament to become chairman of the KPK for the 2019-2023 period. This strategic position facilitates policy-making from within.

In playing his role, Firli was not alone. He involved the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) with reason because of the strong current of radicalism within the KPK. As is known, BIN is chaired by Budi Gunawan, a former aide to Megawati Soekarnoputri when she was the fifth President of the Republic of Indonesia. During the Joko Widodo (BG) era, he failed to become Chief of the Republic of Indonesia Police because he was named a suspect for allegedly owning a fat account by the KPK. At that time, Budi Gunawan was the sole candidate proposed by Joko Widodo to occupy the position of National Police Chief. President Joko Widodo actually has the opportunity to stop the rapid weakening of the KPK, namely by issuing a Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (PERPPU) for the KPK. This means that the new KPK Law and all its derivatives are declared invalid, including the dismissal of KPK employees who meet the TWK requirements.

In the two cases highlighted (revision of the KPK Law and deactivation of KPK employees), the President initially spoke out, but his stance was indecisive. However, when parliament passed the KPK Law, Joko Widodo chose to remain silent until the Law was declared effective. In the case of the National Insight Test, Jokowi also issued a statement, but when the KPK leadership insisted on "deactivating" its employees, the President did not take significant action. This is where all interests reach a meeting point. The operation to weaken the KPK can be carried out by hiding behind the legality of the laws and mechanisms in force, even though all of this is contrary to conscience and the majority of the public votes.

### V. CONCLUSION

The war against corruption in Indonesia has entered the darkest chapter in the reform history. The weakening of the anti-corruption institution KPK has become even more massive and systemic in the era of Joko Widodo's leadership. The strong voice of rejection carried out by anti-corruption activism in the digital public space and the numerous achievements made by the KPK are only considered a passing incident; Jokowi is taking more into account the stability of support from the power of the political elite and economic oligarchy. The course of anti-corruption activism in the digital world is inseparable from social movements and civil society in democracy. This research provides a comprehensive evaluation of the form and causes of a movement that developed and failed to influence state policy. The limitation of this research is that it does not carry out an in-depth analysis of the elite network surrounding power so that they are able to tame policy-makers.

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